SINCE World War II, decolonisation has been so thorough that there now remain few dependent territories of any significant size. Nevertheless the momentum of colonial emancipation is far from spent: in the past few years a number of very small territories 1 have been granted independence, and more may be expected to attain it in the near future.2 In consequence, considerable interest has been shown recently in the eligibility of such territories for membership in the international community,3 and in that community's organised embodi- 
STATEHOOD
The term "State" has sometimes been used to describe territorial units with only a limited degree of independence, such as " protected States" and the component "states" of federations. When used without a qualifying adjective, however, the term generally denotes a full, or " sovereign," State, that is, one with a permanent population, defined territory, effective government, and independence.7 In general, the writers who have discussed territory as criteria of statehood have not stipulated a minimum size. Oppenheim, for example, expressly observes that the territory of the State can be very small, citing as examples the Vatican City, Monaco, San Marino, and Liechtenstein.8 Moreover, although diminutive States often have such limited human and material resources that they find it difficult to establish and operate the full panoply of administrative machinery, the problem is seldom so serious as to negate the existence of an effective government.9 Nor does the requirement of a permanent population normally constitute a problem; and again there seems to be general agreement that size is irrelevant.
It is clear, though, that if a particular diminutive territory does not satisfy these three criteria it cannot constitute a State. This, it is submitted, is the position of the Vatican City.
In the Lateran Treaty of 1929, Italy granted the Pope "full ownership, exclusive and absolute power, and sovereign jurisdiction over the Vatican" (population 1,000; area ? km2). Italy's attitude to the Vatican's statehood is clearly not conclusive, because this would prejudice the rights of third States. And indeed, controversy rages as to the exact legal status of the City. One school of thought, which includes Oppenheim, Lauterpacht, Guggenheim and Verzijl among its members, maintains that it is a State, albeit a tiny one,'? but other writers reject this interpretation, holding that the Vatican does not satisfy the criteria of statehood." It is a nice question, but it is submitted that on balance the latter view is to be preferred.
For many centuries the Pope has been regarded as sovereign, but this status (analogous to, but not identical with, that of the State) attached to him by virtue of his position as Head of the Roman Catholic Church and incumbent of the Holy See, and not because he controlled territory; evidence of this is to be found in the fact that States regarded his sovereignty as unimpaired even when he had no admitted to the UN, as opposed to the Specialised Agencies, she suggested that lack of size and resources compels these " States " to alienate enough of their independence to disqualify them from " comprehensive participation " (that is, full membership of the UN), though they might still be eligible for "limited participation" (for example, full membership in Specialised Agencies). For a number of reasons it is submitted that this generalisation is untenable.
In the first place, it is not strictly true that no diminutive State had become a member of the UN by the time Dr. Higgins' book was published in 1963, unless the concept of "diminutiveness " is given a very narrow interpretation. The sovereignty of Monaco (population 23,000; area 1-5 km2) is more restricted. Her independence was expressly recognised by her neighbour, France, in 1861 and 1918; she has her own laws, She has been a member of the ITU since 1910, and, as party to the Madrid Convention of 1932, was able to remain a member when the Union's membership provisions were revised in 1947. In that year she applied for admission to UNESCO, and though some doubts were expressed as to the potential value of her contribution to the Organisation's work, it was generally agreed that she was a sovereign State, albeit sui generis, and she was admitted.28 Similarly, misgivings about admitting her to the WHO were directed to the value of her contribution, not to her statehood, and she was in fact accepted, albeit with the reservation that this was not to constitute a precedent.29 In 1955 she was admitted to the UPU 30 and has had permanent observer status at UN Headquarters since 1956.
If the sovereignty of Monaco is somewhat questionable, the same cannot be said of the third European diminutive State, San Marino (population 18,000; area 61 km2).31 She has her own laws, the right to conduct her own foreign relations, has concluded treaties with several countries, maintains legations and consulates in various capitals, issues her own passports, and even declared war on Germany in 1944, contrary to the wishes of Italy, of which she is an enclave. It is true that in a treaty of 1897 Italy assured San Marino of her "protective friendship," but this appears to have been simply a pledge to protect her territorial integrity and political independence.
Italy has, on a number of occasions, officially declared that San The independence of two countries in the South Pacific-Western Samoa (population 130,000; area 2,842 km2) and Nauru (population 6,000-only half of whom are Nauruan; area 21 km2) has in a sense been certified by the UN General Assembly, which, in 1961 and 1967 respectively, terminated the trusteeship agreements to which they had been subject.37 The Assembly went so far as to express a wish that Western Samoa be admitted to the UN, should she so desire, but so far she has been unwilling to incur the expense involved in UN membership. She was admitted to the WHO without debate in 1962,38 and to the International Monetary Fund in 1972.39 Nauru was admitted to the UPU and ITU in 1969.40 Tonga (population 75,000; area 699 km2) became independent on June 4, 1970, but so far has not sought admission to the UN, nor, it would seem, to the Specialised Agencies. The conclusion would seem to be that, though certain of these States may possibly not be fully sovereign, this is not true of all of them, and it is certainly not true of the many diminutive States which have joined the UN. 
ABILITY TO FULFIL THE OBLIGATIONS OF MEMBERSHIP
Having established that diminutiveness does not necessarily result in very small countries being unable to meet the criteria of statehood, it is necessary to examine whether such States are materially in a position to fulfil the obligations of membership. This question is logically distinct from the question whether the benefit which such States derive from membership, and the contribution that they can be expected to make to the Organisation's work, make it worthwhile admitting them-a matter which will be examined in the next section.
Before investigating the ability of diminutive States to meet their obligations as members of the UN, it will be instructive to consider the practice of that Organisation's predecessor, the League of The main problem with respect to Luxembourg, which was considered first, was a reservation concerning neutrality; once this was withdrawn, the Plenary unanimously voted to admit her, brushing aside the doubts expressed by some members of the Fifth Committee with respect to her small size.46
The next day, however, the Fifth Committee agreed with its subcommittee that:
There can be no doubt that juridically the Principality of Liechtenstein is a sovereign state, but by reason of her limited area, small population and her geographical position, she has chosen to depute to others some of the attributes of sovereignty. For instance, she has contracted with other Powers for the control of her customs, the administration of her Posts, Telegraph and Telephone Services, for the diplomatic representation of her subjects in foreign countries other than Switzerland and Austria, for final decision in certain judicial cases. Liechtenstein has 41 The dilutions which these obligations eventually suffered had not begun when the question of the admission of the diminutive States came up for consideration. The Plenary accepted this recommendation, and rejected the application, by twenty-eight votes to one (Switzerland),48 though, as will be seen in the next section, it was prepared to consider means short of admission whereby such States could be associated with the League's work. The decision discouraged the other three States from proceeding with their applications, and no further action was taken on them.
The obligations of members of the UN are rather less onerous. Many provisions of the Charter-such as Article 2 (4)-are simply rules of "good behaviour," and do not present a greater problem for diminutive States than for their larger brethren. Virtually the only onerous obligation in the whole Charter is that contained in Article 17 (2)-the obligation to contribute to the Organisation's budget. In 1970 the minimum contribution was $55.126.49 This is a heavy burden for poor countries, and it has deterred some diminutive
States from applying to join, though others, like Kuwait, can easily afford it. However, it is clearly up to each State to decide for itself whether it can afford to join, and the UN has not presumed to reject an application on the grounds that the candidate could not meet the financial obligations of membership.
It has, however, been suggested that diminutive States are unable to fulfil the obligations of membership in the UN because they cannot meet the obligation to participate in sanctions.5? Some support for this view is found in the action of the United States Department of State in dealing with an enquiry from the Pope, shortly after the Dumbarton Oaks meeting in 1944, as to the proposed terms of admission for small States. "The Department of State decided not to encourage the idea of membership for political units 'too small to be able to undertake the responsibilities, such as participation to measures of force to preserve or restore peace,' that would be incumbent on all members of the United Nations." 51 However, while it may be that diminutive States are unable to make a worthwhile contribution to sanctions-a question which relates to 47 the advisability of admitting them-it would seem that they are in general able to fulfil their minimum obligations under the Charter.
In particular, although some diminutive States do not possess armed forces, it is generally accepted that on a true construction of Article 43 (1) of the Charter such members would be fulfilling their duty if they provided only " assistance and facilities, including rights of passage," and not armed contingents as well.52 The fact that Iceland has no armed forces did not produce any objection to her admission in 1946. So far as non-military sanctions are concerned, participation would seem in most cases to be within the power of diminutive States, because the duty is essentially a negative one of refraining from economic and diplomatic relations, and so on, with the State which is the object of sanctions.
Two possible limitations on a diminutive State's ability to participate in sanctions both relate to the fact that some, though not all, diminutive States have, by reason of their lack of human or material resources, been obliged to enter into a special relationship with another, larger State. First, the diminutive State's economic and political dependence may prevent it from taking sanctions against the larger State: it is, for example, inconceivable that Monaco could participate in sanctions against France. However, this is a difficulty which confronts many "normal" States: Zambia, for example, has been unable to break all economic ties with Southern Rhodesia. Moreover, this difficulty has been foreseen in the Charter; Article 49 provides that members "shall join in affording mutual assistance in carrying out measures decided upon by the Security Council," and Article 50 gives States confronted with special economic problems as a result of carrying out preventive or enforcement measures the right to consult with the Security Council with regard to a solution of the problems.
Though there is no guarantee that such States will receive assistance, as Zambia discovered to her cost,53 the machinery does at least exist.
In any case, the possibility of a diminutive State finding itself obliged to participate in sanctions against the one State with which it has a special relationship is so remote that it may be justifiable to ignore it, particularly in view of the fact that the Organisation, in admitting permanently neutral Austria, has shown itself prepared to ignore a country's alleged inability to participate in sanctions against anyone at all.54
The second apparent limitation on a few diminutive States' ability to participate in sanctions stems from the fact that their diplomatic relations, or foreign relations generally, are in the hands of other States, so that they may be unable to participate in sanctions for reasons beyond their control. It is submitted, however, that this is not a real problem. In the first place, the powers so delegated are normally revocable; where they are not, the diminutive "State" is probably not sufficiently sovereign to qualify for membership anyway. Secondly, if the " patron " State is a member of the UNwhich is true of all cases except that of Liechtenstein-the patron will be in breach of Article 2 (5) of the Charter if it obstructs its client's participation in sanctions.
Accordingly, it would seem that, in general, diminutive States are able to fulfil the obligations of membership in the UN. This the UN has tacitly accepted by according membership to 23 such States. In none of these cases was it objected that the country's lack of size made it ineligible for admission. The other six diminutive States have simply not applied for admission.
DESIRABILITY OF MEMBERSHIP
Given, then, that diminutive States are probably able to fulfil th obligations of membership, it is necessary to consider whether it i desirable that they should become full members.
The attractions for diminutive States of UN membership are substantial.55 Whatever may be the strict legal position,56 admission to the world political organisation does serve, politically, to endorse State's independence and to enhance its prestige. It may possibly give it a greater measure of protection from larger States than that afforded to non-members, even though in theory the Charter's system of collective security is all-embracing. The UN is a convenient platform for the airing of grievances, and participation in a bloc may enable the diminutive State better to resist political pressure from more powerful States. Representation at UN Headquarter So far as the Organisation is concerned, it is clearly desirable to associate diminutive States in some way with its system for dealing with threats to international peace: conflicts involving small States may not be serious to begin with, but there is a danger of larger powers being drawn in. Moreover, as Jenks has observed,59 if diminutive States are excluded from the organised international community they may become "havens of exemption for the lawless . . . or for over-mighty interests." 60
On the other hand, the disadvantages for the UN in admitting these States have often been rehearsed. Most large territories are now independent, but if all of the 70-odd remaining dependent territories with populations of less than one million become independent and were admitted to the UN, their combined voting strength would constitute a "blocking third " in the General Assembly, even though their combined populations would amount to no more than that of one medium-sized normal State. (Indeed, there are some 50 diminutive territories whose combined populations amount to only 4-5 millions.61) In alliance with another group, such as the Afro-Asian bloc, they could easily dominate the Assembly: but though they could commit the Organisation to various sorts of responsibilities, their contribution to carrying out these decisions would necessarily be very small. The problem already exists,62 but it would certainly be aggravated by an influx of diminutive States. Such an influx would also put a great strain on the UN's resources, in terms of seating capacity, documentation, duration of meetings, reimbursement of travel expenses of delegates, and so on. 63 Consequently, it has been suggested in many quarters that the legitimate needs of diminutive States and of the United Nations would best be met if the former could be associated with the latter without being granted full membership. Various schemes have been canvassed, some of which hark back to the days of the League of Nations.
ALTERNATIVES TO FULL MEMBERSHIP
It will be recalled that when the First Assembly of the League rejected Liechtenstein's application in 1920, it decided to give further consideration to the possibility of devising some form of association for diminutive States.64 Subcommittee 1 of Committee I reported in the following year that international co-operation, with a view to guaranteeing peace and security, would be best assured if even
States of secondary importance were associated in some degree with the work of the League. Since full membership had been excluded, there were three other possibilities: (a) "association," or full membership without the right to vote; or (b) "representation" by some other state which was already a member; or (c) "limited participation," whereby diminutive states would be able to enjoy all the privileges of membership, but the exercise of these privileges would be limited exclusively to cases in which their own interests were involved. 65 None of these solutions found favour with the First Committee. 66 It was felt that "association" might result in diminutive States delivering lengthy speeches and drawing out meetings inordinately. "Representation " would create an inferior class of members, to which diminutive States would probably refuse to belong; it was also pointed out that there might be political difficulties if such a State chose one neighbour to represent it rather than another. "Limited participation" was also considered to be an unsatisfactory solution, since it might be difficult to ascertain exactly which matters specially affected the interests of the diminutive State. It was also observed that all three solutions would entail amending the Covenant.
In view of the difficulty of laying down in advance conditions for the admission of diminutive States whose different situations might require different solutions, and in view of the possibility that such States could immediately be associated with the work of the League by being allowed to participate in conferences, treaties and the like, the Plenary decided "to await the results of experience of this collaboration." 67 No serious reassessment seems to have taken place, however, and in 1938, in a report to the Assembly on "The Application of the Principles of the Covenant," the idea of some form of association for diminutive States was again summarily rejected on the grounds that it would create more difficulties than it would solve.68 It was, however, the League's consistent policy to invite the collaboration of all non-member States, including the diminutive States, in its work, particularly in the technical fields.69 "Representation" and "limited participation" are, it is submitted, unsuitable means of solving the United Nations' diminutive States problem.
The reasons given by the First Committee of the League Assembly for rejecting the idea of representation of a diminutive State by a "normal" member of the Organisation are not entirely convincing. Normally, diminutive States would have no effective choice as to which State they asked to represent them, and at least some have already accepted a somewhat inferior status by delegating powers of diplomatic representation and the like to other States. However, "representation " is unsuitable for other reasons. If it entails the representing State simply taking account of the interests of the diminutive State in casting its own vote, then the system could not possibly be expected to work: the former is bound to put its own interests before those of the latter. If, on the other hand, it means allowing the diminutive State to vote by proxy, there are several reasons why this should not be permitted. The UN Secretariat has consistently opposed proxy voting generally, both on the grounds that it would contravene the provisions of the Charter 70 and the rules of procedure, and also because representatives are supposed to vote only after hearing a debate on a particular subject.71 The Charter and the rules of procedure could, of course, be amended (though this could be difficult, both technically and politically), but the principle is a good one. Admittedly, delegations rarely change their vote because of what has been said in debate, but they may be able to evaluate problems and proposals better if they hear the discussion. More important, the parliamentary aspect of "parliamentary diplomacy," which does have some good features, would be gravely threatened once proxy voting were permitted for one group of members for the spread of the practice could not be contained. would soon find to their dismay that on an issue which affected them closely the vote had passed to some other member of their grou over whom they had no control, and whose own interest in t subject-matter might be negligible. There is, admittedly, a precede for group membership in some of the Specialised Agencies. However, in those Agencies the groups are composed of dependen territories,78 and that makes a difference: the State which is responsible for them is able to act as the final arbiter of conflicts of interest between the various members of the group,79 whereas there can clearly be no such arbiter of the differences of sovereign States. Moreover, the activities of Specialised Agencies are restricted ratione materiae, which makes it easier to tailor the composition of the group in such a way as to ensure a certain community of interest; no such tailoring would be possible where the UN is concerned, for the potential scope of its activities is unlimited.
The only remaining possibility would seem to be "associate membership "-full membership without the right to vote. It will be recalled that the First Committee of the League Assembly rejected this solution, on the somewhat superficial ground that the associate members would deliver too-lengthy speeches.80 Verbiage is certainly a problem for the UN, but it seems unfair to penalise diminutive States for the sins of all the members. Moreover, the prospect of a large influx of new members might even have the desirable effect of forcing the Organisation to take more drastic action to curtail the length of its meetings.
The need to do something about the diminutive States was first 77 Art. 4 (1) of the Charter (which is the only provision specifically dealing with the qualifications of applicants for admission) expressly uses the singular " state," a point neglected in the American Bar Association discussion- (1968) mooted by the Secretary-General in 1965 81; in 1967 he returned to the question, and, pointing out that full membership for these States might be too onerous for them and might weaken the Organisation, he proposed that a study be made of the ways in which the availability of full membership might be limited, and a form of association devised which might benefit both the diminutive States and the UN.82
The suggestion was taken up by the United States, which raised the matter with the Security Council. The British proposal is simpler. The diminutive State would be admitted in exactly the same way as any other member, but in applying for membership it would voluntarily renounce the right to vote or to hold office. In return for this undertaking, it would be agreed that the member's contribution to the budget would be nominal. The effect would be similar to that of the American proposal, but it has several advantages over the latter.
The British solution avoids the appearance of creating an infer class of members, an important point when one considers h sensitive newly-independent States are about their sovereign Whether either proposal will succeed is another matter. So fa the Soviet Union has been unwilling to commit herself one way the other. Presumably she can see advantages in restricting t voting rights of a group of States, many of whom, by virtue of thei weakness and their background, might be little more than the su servient clients of the colonial powers. On the other hand, s perhaps hopes that these States will in fact join the anti-colonial b and increase pressure on the West over, say, Southern Africa. Mo over, she is unwilling to alienate the "Third World" over th issue, and is apparently biding her time in order to see how tha group responds to the proposals.
So far, the "Third World " does not seem to have entirely mad up its mind. On the one hand, the more members admitted, the more the existing states' relative voting power is diminished; but on the other hand, their ideological commitment to full decolonisation is strong, and they are obviously glad to accept new recruits into their ranks. One of the strongest obstacles to the success of the Anglo-American proposals is the fear that this might be the "thin end of the wedge "-that once it is formally accepted that there is a disparity between voting power and responsibility, the existing members' powers may come under scrutiny. For the smallest members this is a very real fear, for it is hard to conceive what meaningful criterion of diminutiveness would not relegate a country the size of, say, the Maldive Islands (an existing member) to the lower class of associate members.89 With every diminutive State that is admitted to full membership of the UN, the prospects of success for the Anglo-American initiative recede; it may be an indication of the way the wind is blowing that six such States have been admitted since the establishment of the Security Council Committee of Experts. That it would be unfortunate if these proposals were to fail has been treated as self-evident by the majority of commentators. The underlying assumption seems to be that as diminutive States are evidently less important than their larger brethren, they ought to be justification is there for making exceptions in the case of the particularly small and weak? Of course, the gulf between real power and voting power in the General Assembly can, and often does, result in absurdities, but this is endemic to the whole Charter system: is that system to be scrapped, before anything better is found to replace it? The great and powerful have many opportunities today to display and exercise their greatness and power, in many arenas and in many ways. Perhaps it is not such a bad thing that there remains one place where, at least formally, even the weak and insignificant can have an equal say. 89 For statistical data on possible criteria, cf. UNITAR, Status and Problems, pp. 22-45, 206-228. 90 In the vital field of international peace and security, disparities of power are in fact reflected in the Charter, which accords the "Big Five" permanent membership and a veto in the Security Council, cf. Arts. 23 and 27.
